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In another case34 the court announced that where partial dis-
ability was conceded it was improper to deny compensation on
the ground that the difference between the wage earned before
the accident and the earnings thereafter was too insignificant to
be a proper measure of loss of earning capacity. In such a case,
observed the court, the minimum compensation of three dollars
weekly should be awarded.
Civil Procedure
Henry G. McMahon*
THE PETITION
The late Judge Westerfield is reputed to have reminded
counsel, after reading the prayer for damages on a palpably
inflated claim, that the Biblical injunction "Ask and ye shall
receive" had no application to such worldly matters as damage
suits. Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird Co.' presented
the converse of this situation, where the plaintiff failed to pray
for as much damages as it proved it had sustained as the result
of defendant's breach of a contract to purchase scrap steel. The
facts of the case are somewhat involved and, as they are dis-
cussed in another section of this symposium,2 need not be re-
peated here. For present purposes it suffices to point out that
originally plaintiff prayed for $12,500 damages, then in a supple-
mental petition claimed only $6,300, and finally on the trial
proved it had sustained damages of $8,622.40. In its final decision,
rendered after two rehearings had been granted, and with two
justices dissenting on other grounds, the Supreme Court limited
the recovery of damages to the $6,300 prayed for in the amended
petition.
McCarthy v. Osborn3 provides further evidence of a com-
mendable attitude on the part of Louisiana's highest court to
have lawsuits decided on their merits, rather than on procedural
34. Blanchard v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 66 So. 2d 342 (La.
1953).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d 144 (1952).
2. Supra p. 145.
3. 223 La. 305, 65 So. 2d 776 (1953).
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technicalities. In her original petition, the plaintiff here sought to
recover damages from her co-shareholders of a corporation for
preventing her from exercising an option to purchase their cor-
porate stock through an alleged fraudulent merger of the cor-
poration with another. An exception of no cause of action to this
petition was maintained in the trial court, and plaintiff's suit
dismissed, presumably on the ground that no sufficient allegations
of the fraud complained of were set forth in the petition. After
the rendition of this judgment, plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to
file in the trial court an amendment to her original petition, elab-
orating the allegations of fraud in the original petition. As the
amended petition was filed after rendition of judgment, the trial
court's action in refusing to permit its filing was approved. The
appellate court, however, considered both the original and the
amended petitions, concluded that they disclosed a cause of action,
and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to
permit the amended petition to be filed.
In McClatchey v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,4 the Supreme
Court affirmed a judgment dismissing the suit because of a non-
compliance with the trial court's order to amend the verification
of the petition. The allegations of fact in the petition were made
unequivocally, and not on information and belief. The verifying
affidavit executed by the plaintiff5 recited "that all of the allega-
tions of fact [contained in the petition] are true and correct, to
the best of [affiant's] knowledge, information and belief." Under
the Pleading and Practice Act,' the petition must be verified by
an oath "that all of the allegations of fact made in the petition
• . . are true except as to those allegations expressly made on
information and belief, and that as to these, the affiant believes
them to be true." The defendant's exception to the verification
of the petition was maintained by the trial court, and plaintiff
was ordered to amend the defective verification within ten days.
Plaintiff refused to amend, so upon the expiration of the delay
the trial court had no alternative but to dismiss the suit. The
reasons for the Supreme Court's affirmance of the judgment
appealed from are obvious. Not quite so obvious are the answers
to questions which the reader probably is raising mentally.
4. 222 La. 735, 63 So. 2d 738 (1953).
5. Had the verifying affidavit been executed by counsel for the plaintiff,
the great probabilities are that the result would have been different. Cf.
Ducre v. Bagur, 165 La. 307, 115 So. 572 (1928); Grainer v. Bourgeois, 188 So.
423 (La. App. 1939); Wimberly v. White, 54 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 1951).
6. La. R.S. 1950, 13:3601.
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This case high-lights one of the defects of our Pleading and
Practice Act. Plaintiff's verifying affidavit was executed on July
30, 1951. The Supreme Court denied plaintiff a rehearing on
February 4, 1953. Thus, for nearly a year and a half the adjudi-
cation of plaintiff's claim-good, bad, or indifferent-was delayed
pending determination of whether the proper formula had been
employed by counsel for plaintiff for the verification of the peti-
tion. During this period, the valuable time of two courts was
used up in deciding whether there had been any violation of
what amounts to a mere rule of judicial etiquette. True enough,
this delay could, and should, have been averted by amendment
of the verification without insisting upon a decision by either
court. But a system of procedure which makes these useless
delays possible is badly in need of overhauling. Verification and
certification appear to have failed signally in their intended
roles of preventing or minimizing frivolous factual allegations
and exceptions. The only effective way to curb these practices
is to hold counsel directly responsible therefor, under the disci-
plinary power of the court, as is done in federal practice.7 The
Louisiana State Law Institute is recommending this solution of
the problem in the proposed Code of Practice.8
EXCEPTIONS
Only two cases of importance which involved the procedural
exceptions were decided by the Supreme Court during the past
term. In Schackai v. Messa,9 the court furnished further proof
of its liberal policy of permitting amendment of the petition, and
of not disposing of cases on technical exceptions except when
absolutely necessary. The appeal in this case was from a judg-
ment dismissing the suit by sustaining of exceptions of no right
and no cause of action. The suit was brought to recover damages
for the loss of twenty head of cattle alleged to have been shot
7. Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
8. "Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed
by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address
shall be stated. . . Pleadings need not be verified, or accompanied by affi-
davit or certificate, except when otherwise required by law. The signature
of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay .... For a willful
violation of this Article an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disci-
plinary action .. " Art. 9, Pleading, Expos6 des Motifs No. 7 (Louisiana
State Law Institute, 1953), as amended by the Institute's Committee on
Semantics, Style and Publications on August 1 and 2, 1953.
9. 223 La. 626, 66 So. 2d 573 (1953).
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and killed. Under an amended petition, plaintiff alleged that he
could not give any accurate details with respect to the shooting
of the cattle because the facts were solely in the possession of the
defendant. As the trial court concluded that there were no spe-
cific allegations connecting the defendant with the killing of the
cattle, it sustained defendants' exceptions of no right and no
cause of action, and dismissed the suit. The appellate court, in
reviewing this judgment, admitted that the petition was rather
vague, but as it contained a specific allegation that one of the
defendants had made a statement to certain named witnesses
that he had shot two of plaintiff's cattle, the exceptions were
overruled. The trite rule that exceptions of no right and no
cause of action must be overruled when the petition discloses a
right and cause of action as to any part of the demand was
applied to justify the reversal of the judgment. 10
In Cerami v. Haas," the trial court's jddgment, which had
sustained an exception of res judicata and dismissed the suit,
was upheld on appeal. In two previous suits the present plaintiff
had been unsuccessful in asserting the invalidity of a sale made
by him to defendant of certain mineral royalty interests. In his
third suit, plaintiff again sought to have this sale annulled on
the same grounds relied on in the two previous suits. The appel-
late court experenced no difficulty in concluding that, under the
facts, all requirements for pleading the thing adjudged had
been met.
THE TRIAL
The question of whether the plaintiff should be permitted to
discontinue the suit (or the defendant permitted to discontinue
his reconventional demand) after the commencement of the trial
has caused considerable difficulty to the Louisiana courts. Article
491 of the Code of Practice provides that: "The plaintiff may,
in every stage of the suit previous to judgment being rendered,
discontinue the suit on paying the costs. 1' 2 Quite early, in
Crocker v. Turnstall,13 the Supreme Court held that, while a plain-
10. It is difficult to accept the rule relied upon as authority for over-
ruling these exceptions as to defendants other than the one alleged to have
made this extrajudicial admission. It is entirely possible, however, that other
allegations of the petition, not referred to in the opinion, justified the court's
action in overruling the exceptions as to all defendants.
11. 222 La. 899, 64 So. 2d 212 (1953).
12. See, also, Art. 532, La. Code of Practice of 1870, permitting a discon-
tinuance in cases tried before a jury, until the withdrawal of the jury.
13. 6 Rob. 354 (La. 1844).
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tiff had an absolute right to discontinue his suit at any time
before judgment, he had no right to obtain a judgment of nonsuit
thereby, after the trial had begun and evidence had been intro-
duced. A half century later, in State ex rel. Gondran v. Rost,14
the court held that the code provision granted plaintiff no abso-
lute right to discontinue his suit, but that this right was subject
to certain exceptions mentioned in the opinion. The right of the
trial judge to refuse to give plaintiff a judgment of nonsuit, under
Crocker v. Turnstall, was recognized as one of these exceptions
to Article 491. Subsequently, in Rives v. Starcke,'5 both of these
cases were overruled. The court there held that plaintiff's right
to discontinue was absolute and without exceptions; but that the
plaintiff's discontinuance of the suit would be without prejudice
to the defendant's reconventional demand, or of any defense "in
the nature of a reconventional demand." Probably because of
the nebulousness of such a rule, a re-examination of the earlier
cases was had in Barbara, Inc. v. Billelo,e where the court enun-
ciated a more precise rule "that a plaintiff may discontinue his
suit at any time prior to the rendition of judgment 'unless there-
by some acquired right of the defendant would be impaired.' )17
In Breffeilh v. Breffeilh,1 the husband brought suit against
his wife for a judgment based upon continuous separation for
more than two years. The nonresident wife was served through
an attorney-at-law appointed to represent her. The wife, through
counsel of her own selection, voluntarily appeared and filed an
answer, asserted that she was without fault in the separation,
and reconvened, praying for alimony for herself and her minor
child. Upon the conclusion of the trial, but prior to the submii-
sion of the case, the defendant moved to discontinue her recon-
ventional demand insofar as it prayed for alimony for herself.
The trial judge refused to permit the discontinuance, and ren-
dered judgment of divorce, granted defendant alimony for her
minor child, and rejected her reconventional demand for alimony
for herself. From this judgment the defendant wife appealed.
On the first hearing, the Supreme Court approved the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to discontinue her reconventional
demand. The nonresidence of defendant and the fact that the
14. 48 La. Ann. 455, 19 So. 256 (1896).
15. 195 La. 378, 196 So. 657 (1940), noted in 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVEW 457
(1941).
16. 212 La. 937, 33 So. 2d 689 (1947).
17. 212 La. 937, 940, 33 So. 2d 689, 690.
18. 221 La. 843, 60 So. 2d 457 (1952). The alimony aspects of the case are
discussed supra p. 121.
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issues of defendant's fault and right to recover alimony were
deemed sufficient to deny a discontinuance which would leave
defendant free to relitigate these issues. On rehearing, however,
and with Justice Hamiter dissenting, the court reversed itself,
and granted defendant the right to discontinue her reconven-
tional demand for alimony for herself. The majority of the court
based its holding upon the conclusions that no acquired right of
plaintiff would be impaired by the discontinuance, and that,
under the pertinent code provision, defendant was clearly entitled
to such a discontinuance. In reply to plaintiff's contention that
a discontinuance of the reconventional demand might subject
him to the harassment of future litigation, the organ of the major-
ity of the court on rehearing replied: "This complaint is one
that should properly be addressed to the Legislature, because
such a result to a defendant is a natural consequence of the
right given to a plaintiff under Article 491."
While the majority view is justified by the clear language
of the pertinent code provision, the facts of the present case
illustrate the undesirability of the present code rule. A more
effective solution of the problem is afforded under federal prac-
tice,19 where the trial judge is granted discretion to permit or
deny plaintiff's motion to dismiss the suit, upon such terms and
conditions as he deems just.
The constitutional right20 of a litigant, upon request in a
contested civil case not tried by a jury, to have the trial judge
submit a written statement of his findings of fact and reasons
for judgment was invoked in Binks Mfg. Co. v. Guillot.21 Here,
the request for written reasons was presented alternatively
in connection with a motion for a new trial. The asserted failure
of the trial judge to comply with this request was one of the
principal grounds relied upon to support appellant's motion to
remand the case to the trial court for a new trial. Subsequent to
the submission of the case to the appellate court, the trial judge
filed an instrument in the appellate court, reciting that he had
complied with the request to assign written reasons for judgment,
that his written opinion had been filed with the record, and
that he knew of no reason why a copy thereof had not been
included in the transcript of appeal. Additionally, the trial judge
set forth therein the reasons for judgment, as he recalled them,
19. Rule 41 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
20. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 43.
21. 223 La. 337, 65 So. 2d 787 (1953).
1953]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
embodied in the written opinion. As the request for written
reasons for judgment was presented to the trial judge after ren-
dition of the judgment appealed from, and as a remand under
these circumstances would serve no useful purpose, the Supreme
Court overruled appellant's motion.
In Nalty v. Nalty 22-an interdiction proceeding-a night club
owner sought to enforce payment of a number of checks given
him by the incompetent prior to his interdiction. The curator
resisted payment on the ground of the incompetency of the maker
at the time of issuance, to the knowledge of the claimant. The
decision of the trial and appellate courts sustaining this defense,
after a trial of the case on its merits, will be discussed else-
where.23 One rather important point of procedure, however, was
presented on this appeal. On the trial of the case in the court
below, counsel for the curator sought to prove, from the testi-
mony of a medical expert, that at the time these checks were
issued a layman of ordinary intelligence could have detected
the incompetent's mental condition. The answer of the medical
expert indicated that no layman could have detected the par-
ticular form of insanity at the time. After the trial of the case,
counsel for the curator sought, and the trial court permitted,
the reopening of the case to permit clarification on this point,
and to bring out clearly the expert's opinion that at the time of
the issuance of these checks a layman of ordinary intelligence
would have recognized the mental incapacity of the maker. On
appeal, the claimant challenged the validity of the reopening of
the case for this purpose. As the matter of reopening a case for
the reception of further testimony repeatedly has been held to
address itself to the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge,
and as there had been no abuse of discretion in this case, the
Supreme Court made short shrift of this contention of the
appellant.
One of the most interesting procedure cases decided by the
Supreme Court during the past term was Alonso v. Bowers,2 4
where the appellate court affirmed a judgment annulling a prior
judgment by default. The original suit was one on an open
account to recover $1,920.50 for merchandise sold and delivered.
The defendant, through counsel, timely excepted to the petition
on the grounds of the vagueness and generality particularized
22. 222 La. 911, 64 So. 2d 216 (1953).
23. Supra p. 178.
24. 222 La. 1093, 64 So. 2d 443 (1953).
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in the exception. The latter was never tried, but some fourteen
months after its filing, the plaintiff amended his petition to pro-
vide further particulars, and increased his demand to $4,167.22.
Domiciliary service of this amended petition was made by the
sheriff, who served the process upon defendant's wife. Upon
the expiration of the legal delay for answering the amended
petition, plaintiff took a default judgment and in due course con-
firmed it, obtaining judgment against defendant for the $4,167.22
prayed for in the amended petition. Neither the defendant nor
his counsel had any knowledge of this judgment until more than
a year later, when a rule was taken to examine the judgment
debtor. The action of nullity then followed. The appeal was
from the judgment of the trial court annulling the default
judgment.
The admitted facts were that the amended petition in the
original action had been served upon defendant's wife, who
delivered the papers to defendant. The latter did not call the
matter to the attention of his attorney, as he testified that, since
he had employed counsel to defend the suit, he had assumed
that his attorney would be completely familiar with all subse-
quent developments. Defendant's counsel testified that he had
no knowledge whatsoever of the filing of the amended petition
or the taking of judgment by default until the judgment debtor
rule was called to his attention.
Under these circumstances, the appellate court probably
could have sustained the judgment of nullity appealed from on
the ground that the default judgment was premature and invalid,
as it had been taken while the defendant's exception of vague-
ness was pending. The Supreme Court, however, preferred to
rest its decision upon the ill practices of plaintiff in the original
suit. Special emphasis was placed by the appellate court upon
the language of the recent statute25 requiring that: "Every plead-
ing subsequent to the original petition ... shall be served upon
each of the parties affected thereby through his attorney of
record, or on the party, if not represented by an attorney. ... "
It was held that one of the purposes of the adoption of this stat-
ute "was to prevent the very thing that has happened in this case,
that is, the obtaining of a judgment by default because opposing
counsel of record was not aware of pleadings filed in the case
after the original petition. ' 26
25. La. R.S. 1950, 13:3344 et seq., formerly La. Act 217 of 1944. The lan-
guage quoted above is taken from La. R.S. 1950, 13:3345.
26. 222 La. 1093, 1099-1100, 64 So. 2d 443, 445.
1953]
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Prior to the adoption of the statute invoked here, an amended
or supplemental petition had to be served by the sheriff upon
either the defendant or his counsel of record.2 7 The rationale of
this decision seems to argue strongly for an interpretation of the
statute invoked as requiring the service of the amended petition
upon the defendant's counsel of record, and not permitting the
service upon the defendant himself. Yet the appellate court did
not pitch its decision, under Article 606 (2) of the Code of Prac-
tice, upon the lack of proper service of the amended petition. On
the contrary, the organ of the court was very careful to say: 2 8
"It is not our intention to hold, nor do we hold, that the
failure of [the original plaintiff] to comply with the statute
by not serving the supplemental and amended petition on
the attorney of record constitutes a vice of form for which
a judgment may be annulled under the provisions of Article
606 of the Code of Practice; but we are of the opinion that
the facts of this case show that the ill practice of [the orig-
inal plaintiff] in failing to comply with the statute enabled
him to procure the default judgment, and thus the case is one
contemplated by Article 607 of the Code of Practice. On the
basis of equity, therefore, the judgment should be annulled
as its enforcement would be inequitable and unconscionable."
The case serves a very useful purpose in demonstrating the
intention of our highest court not to permit the enforcement of
a judgment obtained through practices of this nature. It serves
the further purpose of demonstrating that the statute invoked
does have a sanction and will be enforced.2 9
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
During the past term, a much greater number of cases were
transferred to the intermediate appellate courts, for lack of
appellate jurisdiction by the Supreme Court, than in any previ-
ous term. One explanation for this was given by the Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Sitges v. Bayou Terre Aux Boeuf Drainage
Dist.30 where it was said:
27. La. R.S. 1950, 13:3471 (15).
28. 222 La. 1093, 1100, 64 So. 2d 443, 445.
29. One of the intermediate courts of appeal previously had held that
La. Act 217 of 1944, § 2 [now La. R.S. 1950, 13:3345] was directory only, as no
sanction had been provided for the enforcement of its provisions. Doll v.
R. P. Farnsworth & Co., 49 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 1950).
30. 221 La. 985, 989-990, 60 So. 2d 895, 897 (1952).
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"This Court became cognizant of the fact that we had
entertained jurisdiction in a number of cases in the past
because the question of our jurisdiction had not been raised,
but under our new rules the appellant is required to set
forth in his brief the appellate jurisdiction of this Court as
applied to the case. See Revised Rules of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana, Rule X, Section 2."
Another reason for the unusual number of appellate trans-
fers is due to the reversal by the Supreme Court of a number of
its former jurisprudential rules on the subject, effecting a gradual
restricting of its appellate jurisdiction.
At least twenty-nine cases31 were transferred to the inter-
mediate appellate courts because the Supreme Court's juris-
diction did not appear affirmatively from the transcript of appeal.
The decision in many of these cases turned upon their peculiar
facts, and discussion thereof would not prove particularly help-
ful. Some of these cases, however, presented important questions
of appellate jurisdiction, which will be considered below.
The transfer of four of these cases was effected under old
and well-settled principles. In Hebert v. T. L. James & Co.,32 and
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. McHenery,"3
the court refused to consider the amount involved under inter-
31. State ex rel. Sitges v. Bayou Terre Aux Boeuf Drainage Dist., 221 La.
985, 60 So. 2d 895 (1952); Nelson v. Associated Branch of Pilots, 221 La. 1015,
61 So. 2d 463 (1952); Louisiana Board of Pharmacy v. Smith, 221 La. 1026,
61 So. 2d 513 (1952); Hebert v. T. L. James & Co., 221 La. 1044, 61 So. 2d 734
(1952); State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Ott; Same v. Montgomery, 221
La. 1061, 61 So. 2d 872 (1952), noted in 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 276 (1953);
Succession of Wesley, 222 La. 411, 62 So. 2d 625 (1952); Tennessee Gas Trans-
mission Co. v. Williams, 222 La. 593, 63 So. 2d 9 (1953); Sexton v. Waggoner,
222 La. 680, 63 So. 2d 423 (1953); Sheridan v. Washington Parish Police Jury,
222 La. 704, 63 So. 2d 609 (1953); Adger v. Oliver, 222 La. 793, 64 So. 2d 6
(1953); Ober v. McGinty, 222 La. 907, 64 So. 2d 215 (1953); Housing Authority
of New Orleans v. Doll, 222 La. 933, 64 So. 2d 224 (1953); Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners v. McHenery, 222 La. 984, 64 So. 2d 242 (1953);
Maxfield v. Gulf State Utilities Co., 222 La. 987, 64 So. 2d 243 (1953); Parker
v. T. Smith & Son, Inc., 222 La. 1061, 64 So. 2d 432 (1953); North Louisiana
Butane Gas Co. v. Helm, 222 La. 1081, 64 So. 2d 438 (1953); State ex rel. Davis
v. Oaklawn Land & Improvement Co., 223 La. 7, 64 So. 2d 623 (1953); Id., 223
La. 10, 64 So. 2d 624 (1953); Duplantis v. Locascio, 223 La. 11, 64 So. 2d 624
(1953); State ex rel. Wood v. Davis-Wood Lumber Co., 223 La. 161, 65 So. 2d
124 (1953); Angelette v. Hardie, 223 La. 167, 65 So. 2d 126 (1953); Beene v.
Pardue, 223 La. 417, 65 So. 2d 897 (1953); D'Asaro v. Cotonio, 223 La. 624, 66
So. 2d 572 (1953); Wainer v. Kirn, 223 La. 669, 66 So. 2d 587 (1953); State ex
rel. Warren Realty Co. v. New Orleans, 223 La. 719, 66 So. 2d 785 (1953);
Bierhorst v. Kelly, 223 La. 737, 66 So. 2d 791 (1953); Brantley v. Tugwell, 223
La. 763, 66 So. 2d 800 (1953); and Matthews v. Hansberry, 223 La. 773, 66 So.
2d 803 (1953).
32. 221 La. 1044, 61 So. 2d 734 (1952).
33. 222 La. 984, 64 So. 2d 242 (1953).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [VOL. XIV
ventions filed by third parties, and held that appellate jurisdic-
tion must be determined by the main demand. In Brantley v.
Tugwell,34 plaintiff sued on a check for exactly $2,000 and prayed
for $300 attorney's fees. Since plaintiff alleged no conventional
agreement by defendant to pay this fee, and there was no
applicable statute awarding such a fee, the Supreme Court held
that exactly $2,000 was in dispute, and transferred the case to
the proper intermediate appellate court. In Angelette v. Hardie,3 5
the case had been originally appealed to a court of appeal, which
had transferred it to the Supreme Court, on the ground that the
property in dispute was worth more than $2,500. In analyzing
the case, the Supreme Court found that, if plaintiff's contentions
were valid, he was one of three heirs who owned the property;
and since his share of the property was worth much less than
$2,000, the appeal was transferred back to the intermediate
appellate court.
Two of the cases transferred by the Supreme Court, Nelson v.
Associated Branch of Pilots3 6 and Bierhorst v. Kelly,37 were
declaratory actions. The transfer of these appeals was ordered
because the record failed to disclose affirmatively that the value
of the rights sought to be ascertained exceeded $2,000. The court's
disposition of these two cases represents no change of judicial
attitude.3 8 The Supreme Court has accepted appellate jurisdic-
tion in a few appeals from declaratory judgments, 9 but these
have all been cases where its appellate jurisdiction was affirma-
tively and clearly established by the transcript of appeal.
The gradual shrinkage of the appellate jurisdiction of the'
Supreme Court during the past term was effected not only
through the sanforizing process of a strict application of the rule
that such jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record,
but also through the overruling of several lines of cases which
had been applied for years. A very commendable change of this
34. 223 La. 763, 66 So. 2d 800 (1953).
35. 223 La. 167, 65 So. 2d 126 (1953).
36. 221 La. 1015, 61 So. 2d 463 (1952).
37. 223 La. 737, 66 So. 2d 791 (1953).
38. On this point, see The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1950-1951 Term, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 121, 191-194 (1952), and The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term, 13 LOUISIANA LAW
REviaw 230, 316-317 (1953).
39. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Nat. Pro. Co., 221 La. 608,
60 So. 2d 9 (1952); Southwest Nat. Pro. Co. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.,
221 La. 617, 60 So. 2d 12 (1952); Horn v. Skelly Oil Co., 221 La. 626, 60 So. 2d
65 (1952); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Thompson, 222 La. 868, 64 So. 2d
202 (1952). See also, Note, 27 Tulane L. Rev. 121 (1952).
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character was made in State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v.
Ott,4 0 where the court simplified the test of its jurisdiction to
entertain appeals "in all cases wherein the ... legality of any tax,
local improvement assessment, toll or impost levied by the State,
or by any parish, municipality, board, or subdivision of the
State is contested. ' '41 As this case is the subject of a note appear-
ing in this issue,42 the reader is referred thereto for an analysis of
of the decision and of its potential effects.
Much less desirable, and certainly more far-reaching, was
the overruling of a long line of cases in this area which had been
accepted and followed without question for more than sixty-five
years by both the court and the profession. Since 1887, it had
been settled in Louisiana that, when the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court did not appear affirmatively from the
record, the court would consider the affidavit of a party reciting
facts showing the value of the property or the rights in dispute.43
If the jurisdictional facts appeared from such an affidavit, and
were not challenged by the opposing party, the Supreme Court
would exercise its appellate jurisdiction over the case. This was
no loose practice indulged in by the court in an unguarded
moment, but a rule adopted and retained after careful consid-
eration of the constitutional factors involved. As the Supreme
, Court said in Frierson v. Cooper:
"This court has original jurisdiction for the determina-
tion of questions of fact affecting its own appellate jurisdic-
tion in any case pending before it14 and may give effect to
the affidavits filed in this court ....
Evidence indicative of the eventual discarding of this rule
accumulated during the past seven years, when the Supreme
Court exercised a very strict scrutiny of these affidavits, and
refused to accept most of them on the ground that the recital of
40. 221 La. 1061, 61 So. 2d 872 (1952).
41. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
42. Infra p. 276.
43. State ex rel. Daboval v. Parish of St. Bernard, 39 La. Ann. 759, 2 So.
305 (1887); Waters Pierce Oil Co. v. Mayor, etc., of New Iberia, 47 La. Ann.
863, 17 So. 343 (1895) ; Garrett v. Spratt, 131 La. 707, 60 So. 199 (1912) ; A. Wein-
field, Inc. v. Ferd. S. Kaufman, Inc., 175 La. 321, 143 So. 277 (1929); Murff v.
Louisiana Highway Commission, 180 La. 664, 157 So. 383 (1934); Fontenot v.
Ludeau, 190 La. 133, 182 So. 125 (1938); Frierson v. Cooper, 196 La. 450, 199
So. 388 (1940), noted in 1 Loyola L. Rev. 110 (1941); Merauxv. R. R. Barrow,
Inc., 219 La. 309, 52 So. 2d 863 (1951).
44. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
45. 196 La. 450, 456, 199 So. 388, 389 (1940), noted In 1 Loyola L. Rev. 110
(1941).
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the amount in dispute was based only on the conjecture, opinion,
or unsupported conclusions of the affiant. 46 During the past term,
in at least five cases,47 the Supreme Court refused to consider any
of these affidavits showing affirmatively its appellate jurisdiction
"because this court not being one of original jurisdiction, effect
cannot be given to any proof submitted after the appeal has
been taken and perfected.'4
Attempts by counsel to agree to the value of the property or
rights in dispute, both before49 and after 0 judgment in the trial
court, likewise have proven unavailing in establishing affirma-
tively the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. These
stipulations were rejected on the ground that jurisdiction could
not be conferred by consent of the parties.
How far will we be carried by the present trend? It has been
at least intimated in one recent case 1 that jurisdiction can be
established affirmatively by the pleadings filed in the trial court.
But would an allegation made in the petition as to the value of
the property or rights in dispute, and admitted in the answer,
be free from the objection that jurisdiction cannot be conferred
by consent of the parties? If testimony is introduced in the trial
court as to the value of the property or rights in dispute, may
not this testimony be subject to rejection on the ground that it
reflects the conjecture, opinion, or unsupported conclusion of the
witness?
The strict rules recently applied by the Supreme Court
appear calculated, at first blush, to relieve its congested docket
by transferring a number of cases to the intermediate appellate
courts. But these strict rules are a two-edged sword, which cuts
both ways. Since a case appealed from a district court to either
the First or Second Circuit Courts of Appeal must involve more
46. New Orleans & Northeastern R. Co. v. Redmann, 210 La. 525, 27 So.
2d 321 (1946); Thalheim v. Gruhlier, 216 La. 502, 43 So. 2d 907 (1949); Prampin
v. Southern Chemical Works, 218 La. 392, 49 So. 2d 737 (1950); Fireside Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, 220 La. 794, 57 So. 2d 687 (1952), noted in 27 Tulane
L. Rev. 121 (1952).
47. Louisiana Board of Pharmacy v. Smith, 221 La. 1026, 61 So. 2d 513
(1952); Succession of Wesley, 222 La. 411, 62 So. 2d 625 (1952); State ex
rel. Davis v. Oaklawn Land & Improvement Co., 223 La. 7, 64 So. 2d 623 (1953);
Ibid., 223 La. 10, 64 So. 2d 624 (1953); Duplantis v. Locascio, 223 La. 11, 64 So.
2d 624 (1953).
48. Succession of Wesley, 222 La. 411, 415, 62 So. 2d 625, 626 (1953).
49. Wainer v. Kirn, 223 La. 669, 66 So. 2d 587 (1953).
50. Adger v. Oliver, 222 La. 793, 64 So. 2d 6 (1953); Beene v. Pardue, 223
La. 417, 65 So. 2d 897 (1953).
51. State ex rel. Davis v. Oaklawn Land & Improvement Co., 223 La. 7,
64 So. 2d 623 (1953).
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than $100,52 there may be some question as to the jurisdiction of
one of these intermediate appellate courts over a case transferred
to it by the Supreme Court because the record does not affirma-
tively indicate what amount is in dispute. Would not the inter-
mediate appellate court be justified in remanding the case to the
trial court for the introduction of evidence establishing the
amount in dispute, and for a subsequent appeal to the proper
appellate court? This is exactly what was done by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal in a very recent case. 3 Complete justi-
fication for such a position appears in Beene v. Pardue,4 where,
with ironic justice, the intermediate appellate court said:
"For identically the same reasons as were assigned in
the opinion of the Supreme Court, to which attention is
hereinabove called, there is no showing of appellate juris-
diction in this court. We observe that the inferences to be
drawn from the stipulation and affidavits are strongly per-
suasive of a finding that the value of the property in dispute
far exceeds the established jurisdiction of this tribunal.
"Under the circumstances, and in the interest of an
orderly disposition of the appeal in this case, we think it
proper to remand the cause to the district court for the recep-
tion of competent evidence as to the value of the property
which is the subject matter of the litigation.
"Accordingly, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that
this suit be, and it is hereby, remanded to the Honorable the
First Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of Caddo,
State of Louisiana, for the purpose of receiving competent
evidence as to the value of the property in dispute as of the
time of trial. It is further ordered that upon determination
of this fact the appeal, if any, be ordered to the court of
appropriate jurisdiction ... ." (Italics supplied.)
The efforts of the Supreme Court during the past few years
to reduce a badly congested docket through the transfer of cases
improperly appealed to that court have gained the sympathetic
approval of the profession. Less favorably received will be the
Supreme Court's abdication of its "original jurisdiction for the
determination of questions of fact affecting its own appellate
52. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 29.
53. Beene v. Pardue, 67 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 1953). See also, Peters v.
Fonville, 67 So. 2d 331 (La. App. 1953); Ilardo v. Agurs, 67 So. 2d 559 (La.
App. 1953).
54. 67 So. 2d 337, 338 (La. App. 1953).
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jurisdiction in any case pending before it."," Of course, jurisdic-
tion cannot be conferred by consent of the parties; but there is
no reason why facts establishing the jurisdiction of the appellate
court cannot be agreed to by the parties, or proven by affidavits
not controverted by the opposing party. These facts in some
instances inevitably will represent the affiant's considered esti-
mate of the value of the property or rights in dispute, but if the
affidavit or stipulation further shows the training and experience
of the affiant to be such that he would be considered competent
to testify as to such value, then there is no reason why the
appellate court should not consider his opinion. These are the
very reasons why, ever since 1898,56 our constitutions have
expressly conferred upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
Two appeals were dismissed by the Supreme Court during
the past term on the ground that they presented only moot
questions.57 The remaining cases on the subject involved only
the application of settled principles of determining appellate
jurisdiction. In Hammack v. Resolute Fire Ins. Co.,58 it was held
that a penalty and reasonable attorney's fee allowed by statute
would be added to the principal amount in dispute to determine
appellate jurisdiction. In D'Asaro v. Cotonio,5 the trite rule that
appellate jurisdiction is determined by the amount in dispute at
the time the case is submitted to the trial court for a decision
was again applied. As the defendant's answer admitted an
indebtedness which reduced plaintiff's claim below $2,000, and
defendant's reconventional demand could not be considered in
determining jurisdiction, the'case was transferred to the proper
court of appeal. In Parker v. T. Smith & Son,6 ° a number of sep-
arate claims, each less than $2,000, were cumulated by the plural
55. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
56. Ibid.; La. Const. of 1913, Art. 85; La. Const. of 1898, Art. 85. Prior to
1898, the Supreme Court must have considered that it had an inherent orig-
inal jurisdiction in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Cf. State ex rel. Daboval
v. Parish of St. Bernard, 39 La. Ann. 759, 2 So. 305 (1887); Waters Pierce
Oil Co. v. Mayor, etc., of New Iberia, 47 La. Ann. 863, 17 So. 343 (1895).
57. State ex rel. Clement Betpouey, Jr. & Co. v. Jefferson Parish Water-
works District No. Five, 223 La. 566, 66 So. 2d 338 (1953)-mandamus pro-
ceeding by unsuccessful bidder to annul award of contract completed pend-
ing appeal; Freret Civic Ass'n v. Orleans Parish School Board, 223 La. 407,
65 So. 2d 893 (1953)-devolutive appeal from denial of preliminary injunction
to prevent conversion of school to Negro usage, when conversion had been
made pending appeal.
58. 223 La. 655, 66 So. 2d 583 (1953).
59. 223 La. 624, 66 So. 2d 572 (1953).
60. 222 La. 1061, 64 So. 2d 432 (1953).
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plaintiffs. The rule that these claims could not be aggregated
for the purpose of determining appellate jurisdiction sufficed to
force a transfer of the case to an intermediate appellate court.
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Under R.S. 9:438, an appeal from a judgment rendered in an
adoption proceeding must be taken within thirty days. In Ball
v. Campbell,61 the judgment was rendered, read, and signed on
April 21, 1952. The same day, the unsuccessful plaintiff moved
for a new trial, and this motion was not denied until April 30,
1952. On this latter date, plaintiff obtained an order of appeal,
conditioned upon the furnishing of a devolutive appeal bond of
$100. The appeal bond was not filed until June 2, 1952, so defen-
dants moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal
was not perfected within the thirty days allowed by law. As the
effective date of the judgment appealed from was April 30th,
and as May 30th and 31st, and June 1st, were all legal holidays,
the Supreme Court held that the bond had been filed timely.
Forfeiture of a tractor-trailer allegedly used to import un-
taxed cigarettes into the state was sought in Cooper v. One
White Model 1950 Motor Tractor.'" The owner of the truck
appeared through counsel to resist the forfeiture. The Fruehauf
Trailer Company intervened in the proceedings, and claimed a
preference in the distribution of the proceeds of any judicial
sale under a prior chattel mortgage. The owner and the chattel
mortgagee obtained separate orders of appeal from adverse judg-
ments rendered against them. The chattel mortgagee's appeal
had been made returnable on July 11, 1952, while the owner's
appeal had been made returnable to the appellate court on
August 4, 1952. The transcript of appeal was filed in the Supreme
Court on the latter date. Based upon the failure of the chattel
mortgagee to have filed the transcript of appeal in the appellate
court on or before July 11th, and to have obtained any extension
of its return date, appellees moved to dismiss this appeal on the
ground of abandonment. The Supreme Court held that, as the
owner and the chattel mortgagee were adverse parties, the filing
of the record by the owner on August 4th did not inure to the
benefit of the chattel mortgagee. The appeal of the latter was
dismissed.
61. 222 La. 399, 62 So. 2d 621 (1952).
62. 223 La. 1, 64 So. 2d 445 (1953).
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The motion to dismiss the appeal, in Succession of Nunley, 8
was based upon the failure to cite one of the appellees. Dece-
dent's will had been probated contradictorily against the pre-
sumptive legal heirs at the instance of Annie White. Subse-
quently, on the joint petition of Annie and Jasper White, they
were recognized as the sole legatees of decedent and sent into
possession of her estate. The presumptive heirs petitioned for
an appeal from this latter judgment, praying that Annie and
Frank White be duly cited. Before the return day, and in the
trial court, the appellants moved for citation of appeal upon
Jasper White, and recited that inadvertently citation had been
prayed for in their petition of appeal upon Frank White. No
citation of appeal upon Jasper White was ever issued, and
because of this, and as he was a necessary party to the appeal,
the appellees moved to dismiss on this ground. This motion was
overruled by the appellate court on the ground that the failure
to cite Jasper White was not attributable to the appellants. An
additional delay of thirty days was allowed the appellants to cite
this appellee.
The appeal granted in Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Marks 4
was sought to be dismissed on the ground that the appellants,
the unsuccessful claimants of a fund deposited in court under an
interpleader proceeding, had failed to file an appeal bond as
required by law. The appellants had petitioned for an appeal
conditioned upon their filing a bond to be fixed by the trial
judge. The latter granted appellants an unqualified order of
appeal, on the ground that no appeal bond was necessary as
theoretically only costs would be secured by this bond, and under
the interpleader statute costs were to be taken out of the
fund deposited. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial
judge's position that no appeal bond was necessary, but as the
failure to file such a bond was not attributable to the appellants,
the case was remanded to the trial court to permit the fixing of
the amount of the bond, and to enable the appellants to execute
and file this bond within the delay allowed by the appellate
court.
Three appeals 5 were dismissed during the past term by the
63. 222 La. 730, 63 So. 2d 737 (1953).
64. 223 La. 662, 66 So. 2d 585 (1953).
65. Hyde v. Sims, 221 La. 1088, 61 So. 2d 881 (1952), 222 La. 567, 62 So. 2d
837 (1953); Vaughn v. American Bank & Trust Co., 223 La. 479, 66 So. 2d 4
(1953); Gulf States Finance Corp. v. Colbert, 223 La. 743, 66 So. 2d 793 (1953).
See also, Wainwright v. Wainwright, 221 La. 787, 60 So. 2d 410 (1952), where
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Supreme Court through application of the rule that the filing of
the appeal bond divests the trial court of jurisdiction except to
test the sufficiency of the appeal bond as of the date of filing.ee
In Hyde v. Sims, 67 the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal on
the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant the
order therefor. The plaintiff and appellant originally had moved
for and obtained an order of appeal, conditioned upon the fur-
nishing of a $250 appeal bond. Subsequently, plaintiff obtained
a second order of appeal, conditioned upon the furnishing of a
$200 appeal bond. This last bond was filed, and in due course
the transcript of appeal was lodged in the appellate court in
this rule was invoked as one of the two reasons for affirming the judgment
appealed from. This latter case is discussed on its merits, supra p. 120.
66. A long line of cases supports the rule as stated above. Dannenmann
& Charlton v. Charlton, 113 La. 276, 36 So. 965 (1903); Borah & Landen v.
O'Niell, 121 La. 733, 46 So. 788 (1908); Cluseau v. Wagner, 126 La. 375, 52 So.
547 (1910); Board of Com'rs v. Howard Land & Timber Co., 132 La. 911, 61
So. 868 (1913); State ex rel. Continental Supply Co. v. Fontenot, 152 La. 912,
94 So. 441 (1919); Mundy v. Phillips, 157 La. 445, 102 So. 519 (1924); Jaenke v.
Taylor, 161 La. 996, 109 So. 814 (1924); Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg
Co., 177 La. 373, 148 So. 440 (1933); Mistich v. Holman, 205 La. 171, 17 So. 2d 23
(1944); Borgnemouth Realty Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 211 La. 255, 29 So. 2d
841 (1947); Wainwright v. Wainwright, 221 La. 787, 60 So. 2d 410 (1952);
Vaughn v. American Bank & Trust Co., 223 La. 479, 66 So. 2d 4 (1953); Gulf
States Finance Corp. v. Colbert, 223 La. 743, 66 So. 2d 793 (1953); Davidson v.
Richard McCarthy Co., 166 So. 504 (La. App. 1936); State ex rel. Temple v.
Vernon Parish School Board, 178 So. 176 (La. App. 1938); Bates v. Hayden,
188 So. 170 (La. App. 1939); Horton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 200 So. 44
(La. App. 1941); Felder v. Springfield Farmers' Cooperative Ass'n, 29 So. 2d
547 (La. App. 1947); Gasoline Plant Const. Corp. v. Blair, 38 So. 2d 662 (La.
App. 1949).
However, this statement of the rule is too general to be accurate in at
least one, and possibly two respects.
Firstly, when the appeal bond is defective or insufficient, the appellant
must be given notice thereof in the trial court, so as to be afforded an oppor-
tunity to correct it. La. R.S. 1950, 13:4572. Unless such notice is given in the
trial court, the appellate court will not consider any such objection to the
bond. Wilson v. Lee, 196 La. 271, 199 So. 117 (1940). See also, Stewart v.
Clay, 166 La. 278, 117 So. 147 (1928); Thompson v. Succession of Gow, 169 La.
546, 125 So. 588 (1929); Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Sternberg Co., supra;
State ex rel. Young v. Judge, 172 So. 218 (La. App. 1937); West Bros. v. Pier-
son, 2 So. 2d 71 (La. App. 1941); Secari v. Uchello, 42 So. 2d 100 (La. App.
1949).
Secondly, a line of cases, not overruled but inconsistent with the general
statement of the rule contained in the jurisprudence first cited in this note,
expressly holds that, even after the filing of the appeal bond, the trial court
possesses jurisdiction to recall the order of appeal when it has been granted
improvidently or erroneously. State ex rel. Gill v. Tissot, 34 La. Ann. 90
(1882); State ex rel. Sutcliffe v. Monroe, 45 La. Ann. 1322, 14 So. 59 (1893);
Charvanel v. Esvard, 150 La. 305, 90 So. 658 (1922). Cf. Boudreaux v. Bennett,
161 La. 217, 108 So. 420 (1926). The only case which could be found in which
the conflict between these two lines of cases was noted was State ex rel.
Massicot v. Bahns, 35 So. 2d 37 (La. App. 1948), where the Orleans Court of
Appeal, in a per curiam opinion, followed the latest rulings of the Supreme
Court.
67. 221 La. 1088, 61 So. 2d 881 (1952).
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accordance with the second order of appeal. Appellee then moved
to dismiss this appeal on the ground that the trial court's juris-
diction to grant a second order of appeal had been divested by
the filing of the first appeal bond. This motion was overruled on
the ground that the transcript of appeal did not show that this
first appeal bond had ever been filed; but the court recognized the
fact that, if this bond had been filed, the motion to dismiss would
have been valid. Subsequently, appellee supplemented the
record by filing a certified copy of the first appeal bond filed in
the trial court, and at the same time renewed its motion to dis-
miss.6 8 This second motion was sustained as a matter of course,
and the appeal was dismissed.
A somewhat similar factual situation obtained in Vaughn v.
American Bank & Trust CoY9 There, the unsuccessful plaintiff
first moved for and was granted an appeal to one of the courts
of appeal, conditioned upon furnishing bond in the sum of $100,
and that same day filed the appeal bond in the trial court. Subse-
quently, plaintiff moved for and obtained the rescission of the
first order of appeal, and then obtained an appeal to the Supreme
Court, conditioned upon the furnishing of bond for $100. The
transcript of appeal was filed in the Supreme Court pursuant
to the second order of appeal, and appellee immediately moved
to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the trial court had been
divested of jurisdiction in the case by the filing of the first appeal
bond, and that its orders cancelling the first order of appeal and
granting a second were invalid. The appeal to the Supreme
Court was dismissed on the grounds assigned by appellee in its
motion.
Stripped of its involved and confusing procedural trivia,
Gulf States Finance Corp. v. Colbert70 presented only two issues,
both of which were disposed of by the Supreme Court through
the application of simple procedural principles. The first of two
appeals prosecuted by the defendant to an intermediate appellate
court was held to have been properly dismissed by that court,
as the order of appeal had been obtained on motion at a term
subsequent to that in which the judgment appealed from had
been rendered, and the appellant had failed to move for the
issuance of a citation of appeal. The second of these appeals
likewise was held to have been properly dismissed by the inter-
68. Hyde v. Sims, 222 La. 567, 62 So. 2d 837 (1953).
69. 223 La. 479, 66 So. 2d 4 (1953).
70. 223 La. 743, 66 So. 2d 793 (1953).
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mediate appellate court, as the trial court had been divested of
jurisdiction by the filing of the first appeal bond, and its second
order of appeal was invalid.
SUPERVISORY PROCEDURE
No cases of particular importance were decided by the
Supreme Court during the past term in the field of supervisory
jurisdiction and procedure. In Mataya v. Delta Life Ins' Co.,71
under a writ of review, the Supreme Court annulled the decree
of the intermediate appellate court which had reversed the trial
court's judgment. The court of appeal's decision was based upon
the position that the defense relied on was not available, as the
policy sued on was not an "industrial insurance policy" within
the intendment of the Insurance Code.7 2 Though the Supreme
Court, under its supervisory jurisdiction, might have decided
the case as fully as if on appeal, the Supreme Court remanded
the case to the court of appeal to afford the latter an opportunity
to consider the case on its merits.
Alternative writs of prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari
issued in Pellegrin v. City of Gretna73 were recalled, as the ques-
tion had become moot by the time the case was argued in the
Supreme Court.74
In Ball v..Campbell,75 alternative supervisory writs had been
issued at the instance of plaintiff, to inquire into the validity
of a judgment of the Juvenile Court of New Orleans which
denied the act of adoption sought by plaintiff, and ordered the
trial court's Probation Department to take the child into custody
pending placement with its natural mother. At the time of the
argument of the case, a devolutive appeal from the juvenile
court's judgment was pending in the Supreme Court. As the
application for writs presented complicated issues impressed
with a public interest, the Supreme Court withheld a decision
on the merits of the case pending disposition of the pending
appeal. The alternative writs were made peremptory, however,
so as to maintain the status quo pending appeal.
71. 222 La. 509, 62 So. 2d 817 (1953).
72. This aspect of the case is discussed supra p. 167.
73. 222 La. 527, 62 So. 2d 824 (1953).
74. The alternative supervisory writs had been applied for to compel the
trial judge to grant injunctive relief against the enforcement of a municipal
ordinance revoking a 1952 liquor license issued to the applicant. This license
had expired prior to the argument of the case in the Supreme Court.
75. 222 La. 357, 62 So. 2d 511 (1952).
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The defendant in Frederick v. Brown Funeral Homes76
applied for supervisory writs to compel the trial judge* to rescind
a preliminary injunction which prohibited defendant's proposed
operation of a funeral home in a residential area of Covington.
The case is somewhat unique in that it is one of the rare cases
where, on application for supervisory writs, the Supreme Court
has granted a rehearing of its initial decision. On the original
hearing, with two justices dissenting, the court recalled the
alternative writs previously issued. On rehearing, with the
author of the original opinion dissenting, the Supreme Court
dissolved the preliminary injunction complained of,7 7 and re-
manded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
SUCCESSION PROCEDURE
Only one case of importance involving probate procedure
was decided during the past term. In Hicks v. Hughes,75 the
principal issue presented was as to the validity of a judicial
sale of a half interest in property owned by the mother of defen-
dants allegedly to pay the debts of her succession. The admin-
istrator's application for the order to sell this property was not
accompanied by any statement of the debts of the succession, and
the order for the judicial sale was signed by the clerk of court.
The proof showed that the succession had owed no debts. Under
these circumstances, since the statute under which the clerk of
court had acted required that the application to sell property
be accompanied by a statement of the debts of the succession,
the Supreme Court ruled that the clerk of court had acted with-
out power or jurisdiction in signing this order, and that the latter
was an absolute nullity. Accordingly, the court held that the
nullity affecting the order was not due to any informality barred
by the prescription of five years under the then applicable code
provision, and that the judicial sale could not serve as the basis
of the acquisitive prescription of ten years.
EXECUTORY PROCESS
One of the most effective procedural devices of Louisiana
practice is executory process, which permits the speedy and
inexpensive enforcement of a mortgage or privilege evidenced
76. 222 La. 57, 62 So. 2d 100 (1952).
77. The merits of the case are discussed supra p. 140.
78. 223 La. 290, 65 So. 2d 603 (1953). This case is also discussed supra
p. 154.
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by an authentic act importing a confession of judgment. As the
order for the judicial seizure and sale of the property is issued
ex parte, actually the only day in court which the defendant
obtains to urge his defenses to the action is by way of injunction
to arrest the seizure and sale. Appeal-either suspensive or
devolutive-is a remedy so hollow as to be almost academic.
Probably the greatest defect in executory procedure heretofore
has been afforded by our Supreme Court decisions holding that
the lack of authentic evidence to justify the executory process
could not be urged through injunction, but must be raised on
appeal. In General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 7 9 these
cases were expressly overruled. In an excellent opinion written
by Chief Justice Fournet, a unanimous court held that the defen-
dant could raise the lack of authentic evidence by way of a peti-
tion for injunctive relief to enjoin the seizure and sale of the
property. As this case is the subject of a note appearing in this
issue,80 the reader is referred thereto for a discussion of the case.
GARNISHiVIENT
First State Bank v. Burton"' was an interesting case involv-
ing garnishment under the writ of attachment. On the ground
of the nonresidence of the defendant, a writ of attachment was
issued, under which garnishment process was served upon an oil
company. The latter answered, categorically denying any indebt-
edness to the defendant. The garnishee's answer then admitted
that it had entered into a contract with defendant to pay one-
half of the costs of a test well in an area in which the garnishee
was interested; that it had attempted to discharge this indebted-
ness by issuing two checks payable jointly to the defendant and
to the drilling contractors on this test well, which had been
refused by the drawee bank because of the unauthorized endorse-
ment by defendant in the names of the drilling contractors; and
pleaded further that the question of its indebtedness to defen-
dant could not be determined until the rights of these drilling
contractors against the defendant could be determined in sep-
arate litigation. Plaintiff then filed a rule to traverse the answers
of the garnishee, and on the trial thereof the district court
ordered the rule discharged and the garnishee relieved from
further answering. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
79. 222 La. 1019, 64 So. 2d 417 (1953).
80. Infra p. 289.
81. 222 La. 1030, 64 So. 2d 421 (1953).
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The Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances, the gar-
nishee could have protected itself in two ways: by depositing
the money into the registry of the court, and provoking a con-
cursus proceeding so as to implead all interested parties; or by
proceeding as it did, in which case plaintiff would be required
to bring these interested parties into the garnishment proceed-
ings for the purpose of having their rights determined. The case,
however, was remanded to the trial court, with instructions to
permit plaintiff to cite all interested parties.
Evidence
George W. Pugh*
As might well be expected, numerous points of evidence
were presented to and decided by the Supreme Court during
the past year. For obvious reasons only the most interesting
and most significant will be discussed here.
RISK OF UNDUE PERSUASION-PHOTOGRAPHS OF DECEASED
In 1947 the Supreme Court stated in State v. Morgan1 that
on the retrial of that case, certain gruesome or ghastly pictures
of the deceased victim should be excluded-"unless the State
shows some necessary purpose for the introduction of the pho-
tographs in evidence. '2 The photographs in question had been
presented for the alleged purpose of proving the corpus delicti,
and the nature, scope and extent of the wounds received by
deceased. Ample testimony had already been introduced as to
these matters, and the Supreme Court understandably feared
that the admission of the photographs might disturb the jury
in its deliberations.
Sound judicial administration demands that the trial court
exercise broad discretion in its control of a trial, but, of course,
it must be ever alert to protect a litigant from a decision dic-
tated by emotion rather than reason. Both legislative acts and
appellate decisions should provide trial courts with criteria for
the exercise of this discretion. The guiding rule of State v.
* Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 211 La. 572, 30 So. 2d 434 (1947), noted in 22 Tulane L. Rev. 327 (1947).
2. 211 La. 572, 579, 30 So. 2d 434, 436.
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